Globalisation & Trade
The Boomerang: Why Freezing Money Might Unfreeze the World
When the West froze roughly 300 billion dollars of Russian central bank reserves in 2022, it didn't just punish Moscow — it quietly terrified every other country watching.
The Idea
For most of the postwar era, the dollar's dominance in global finance was treated as a convenience — the world's shared plumbing. Countries held reserves in dollars, settled trade in dollars, and routed payments through SWIFT, the Belgian-based messaging network that underpins international banking, because it was simply the most efficient thing to do. Almost nobody thought of this infrastructure as a weapon. Then they watched Russia get cut off from it. Sanctions have existed for decades, but their recent form is something qualitatively different. The United States and its allies have shifted from broad trade embargoes toward what analysts call the weaponisation of financial infrastructure — using control over dollar clearing, SWIFT access, and reserve asset custody as instruments of geopolitical pressure. The logic is elegant: if virtually all international trade flows through the dollar system, denying access to that system is devastating. It doesn't require troops or blockades. But the weapon has a flaw built into its design. Its power depends entirely on the target's dependence — and on everyone else's continued trust that the same weapon won't be turned on them. Every time sanctions freeze a sovereign state's assets, every other sovereign state updates its threat model. The dollar's utility as a reserve currency has always rested on a perception of neutrality. Sanctions erode that perception. If the dollar can be weaponised, it ceases to be a risk-free store of value. And a reserve currency that isn't risk-free is a reserve currency with a credibility problem.
In the World
In February 2022, within days of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a coalition of G7 nations and the EU froze roughly 300 billion dollars in Russian central bank reserves — assets held in Western financial institutions, primarily through Euroclear, the Belgian securities depository. It was an unprecedented act of financial coercion at sovereign scale, immobilising around half of Russia's total foreign exchange reserves in one coordinated move. What followed revealed just how complicated the weapon is to wield. In December 2025, EU member states first voted to freeze those assets indefinitely — removing the awkward requirement for unanimous six-month renewals — but then found themselves unable to agree on how to use them. Belgium, which hosts the bulk of the funds at Euroclear, refused to back a plan that would have channelled the assets directly into loans for Ukraine, citing legal liability concerns. The December 2025 EU summit ultimately backed a 90 billion euro loan drawn from EU capital markets instead, leaving the frozen Russian assets untouched as collateral for a future reparations settlement. Meanwhile, the target was adapting. Russia developed SPFS, its own financial messaging system, as a SWIFT alternative; by early 2025, some 177 financial institutions across 24 countries had joined it. Trade between Russia and third countries such as China, India, and Turkey expanded to partly absorb what Western markets closed off. The dollar's share of global foreign exchange reserves slipped to around 57 percent by mid-2025, down from roughly 70 percent at the start of the century. The concern driving these moves was not confined to adversaries: it was allies recalibrating their exposure to a financial system they now understood could be turned against them too.
Why It Matters
There is a central paradox at the heart of financial sanctions: their effectiveness depends on the very trust that aggressive use of them destroys. The more credibly you can threaten to freeze someone out of the system, the more incentive every participant has to build a door out of the system. What's emerging isn't de-dollarisation in the dramatic sense — no rival currency is remotely close to replacing the dollar's depth and liquidity. It's something more subtle: a gradual defanging. Countries are building parallel rails, settling more trade in local currencies, and diversifying reserve holdings — not to dethrone the dollar, but to insure against the risk of being the next target. The weapon is still powerful. It's just becoming slightly less powerful each time it's used. For anyone thinking about globalisation, this is the real lesson: interdependence was supposed to make conflict costly for everyone. But when one party controls the pipes, interdependence becomes leverage. The question now is whether the architecture of global finance slowly fragments into competing blocs — each with its own plumbing — or whether the dollar's network advantages prove durable enough to outlast the trust problem. That outcome isn't settled yet, and the choices being made right now will shape it for decades.
A Question to Ponder
If the power of financial sanctions depends on the world staying inside the dollar system, and using those sanctions incentivises countries to leave it, is there a level of sanction use beyond which the tool destroys the very power it relies on — and have we already passed it?
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