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What Money Actually Is

The Most Dangerous Thing a President Can Do to an Economy

You can survive bad tax policy, bad trade policy, even bad spending policy — but the moment a government gets its hands on the interest rate, something much harder to fix begins to break.

The Idea

Central bank independence is one of the least glamorous and most consequential ideas in modern economics. The core proposition is simple: the institution that controls the money supply should not answer to whoever won the last election. Politicians have strong incentives to push for cheap money — low rates stimulate growth, make borrowing feel painless, and generate a brief sugar rush that photographs well ahead of a vote. The problem is that inflation is the hangover, and it arrives after the election, not before it. So the conventional solution, adopted across most wealthy democracies over the past four decades, is to hand monetary policy to unelected technocrats with long, fixed terms and a narrow mandate: keep prices stable. This isn't about trusting economists more than democracy. It's about recognising a specific structural problem — what economists call the 'time inconsistency' of monetary policy. A government that controls the printing press has every short-term reason to use it generously and every long-term reason not to. The separation between central bank and treasury is designed to protect tomorrow's economy from today's political calendar. What's often underappreciated is that independence only works if it's believed. It's not just a legal arrangement — it's a credibility signal to bond markets, businesses, and households. When people trust that the central bank will do what it takes to keep inflation near its target, they build that into wage negotiations, long-term contracts, and investment decisions. That anchor is worth an enormous amount. And once it slips, it is extraordinarily expensive to rebuild.

In the World

Turkey offers the cleanest modern demonstration of what happens when a head of state decides he knows better than the central bank. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan holds the unorthodox belief that high interest rates cause inflation — the opposite of what virtually every economist argues. Acting on that conviction, he fired four central bank governors between 2019 and 2023 whenever they moved rates in a direction he disliked. In March 2021, he dismissed governor Naci Agbal just two days after the bank raised rates to 19 percent to address surging inflation — Agbal had been in the job for less than five months and had, in that time, rebuilt enough credibility that the lira had strengthened significantly. His successor was a former parliamentarian from Erdogan's own party, known for sharing the president's views on rates. The result was not lower inflation. Between 2017 and 2024, the Turkish lira lost roughly 89 percent of its value against the dollar, and consumer inflation climbed past 85 percent at its peak. Only after Erdogan's re-election in 2023 — when political incentives shifted — did Turkey return to orthodox policy, hiking rates back toward 50 percent to try to restore what had been destroyed. The US produced its own version of this drama across 2025 and 2026. Trump's administration pursued legal action to remove Federal Reserve governor Lisa Cook and subjected then-chair Jerome Powell to sustained pressure. Trump nominated Kevin Warsh — sworn in as chair on 22 May 2026 — a pick widely interpreted as likely to bring the Fed closer to White House preferences. What happened next confounded that reading: Warsh publicly reaffirmed the Fed's independence and made clear that inflation, still running above the two percent target, would remain the institution's primary focus.

Why It Matters

This isn't just an abstract institutional question that belongs in a macroeconomics seminar. When central bank independence erodes, the effects show up in the cost of your groceries, the rate on your mortgage, and the purchasing power of whatever savings you have. The mechanism is not complicated: once markets doubt that a central bank is genuinely free to fight inflation, they begin to price in the expectation that it won't — and that expectation itself makes inflation harder to tame. Credibility, once lost, is rebuilt slowly and painfully. The Turkey case is vivid precisely because it isn't some distant historical curiosity. It happened in real time, was watched by global markets, and produced the entirely predictable result that the textbook predicts. The lesson worth carrying is that the value of an independent central bank is almost invisible when it's working — prices are stable, long-term planning is possible, money holds its meaning. It only becomes visible in the wreckage of its absence. That invisibility is probably why politicians keep being tempted to test it.

A Question to Ponder

If central bank independence is so clearly valuable, why do democratically elected leaders keep undermining it — and what does that tell us about which incentives actually drive political decision-making?

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