Debt & Its Consequences
The Equation That Decides Whether Your Government Can Keep Borrowing Forever
For decades, wealthy governments could borrow almost without consequence — not because they were disciplined, but because one small mathematical fact was quietly working in their favour.
The Idea
The idea hinges on two letters: r and g. Here, r is the average interest rate a government pays on its debt, and g is the rate at which the economy grows. For most of the post-war era, g beat r — meaning economies expanded faster than the interest bill compounded. The implications of that simple arithmetic are profound. When g exceeds r, a government can run a deficit and still watch its debt shrink as a share of GDP, because the denominator — the whole economy — is growing faster than the numerator. The debt burden quietly erodes over time without anyone having to tighten a belt. Economists sometimes call this the 'free lunch' of cheap debt. The economist Olivier Blanchard made this point forcefully in a landmark 2019 lecture, arguing that decades of r below g meant governments had far more fiscal room than conventional wisdom assumed — and that debt accumulated during that era came with a lower long-run cost than typically feared. The catch is that this arrangement is not a law of nature. It is a contingent condition. And conditions change. When r climbs above g, the arithmetic reverses with uncomfortable speed. The debt now grows faster than the economy, meaning the government must generate a primary surplus — spending less than it collects in taxes, before interest — just to keep the debt ratio stable. If it cannot, the debt ratio rises, which tends to push interest rates higher still, which makes the problem worse. Economists call this dynamic a debt spiral, and it is exactly the kind of feedback loop that makes fiscal crises self-fulfilling.
In the World
The United States offers the starkest live illustration of what happens when the r-g advantage dissolves. For most of the fifteen years following the 2008 financial crisis, the real interest rate on US federal debt averaged well below the real growth rate — a gap that gave successive administrations room to borrow heavily during recessions and pandemics without triggering a crisis. That cushion has since narrowed sharply. Since 2023, most newly issued US federal debt has carried interest rates in the range of four to five percent, above the economy's expected long-run growth rate. The Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, citing CBO's February 2026 baseline, notes that later in the decade the average interest rate on all federal debt is projected to exceed nominal economic growth — crossing into r-greater-than-g territory that could represent the start of a debt spiral. By 2056, CBO's baseline has public debt at around 175 percent of GDP, with net interest costs reaching roughly 6.9 percent of GDP. In FY2025, the federal government's net interest budget line came to 970 billion dollars — nearly three times what it was just five years earlier — equivalent to 19 percent of all federal revenue. The United Kingdom is navigating the same shift from a different starting point. In 2025-26, the UK government spent roughly 109 billion in debt interest payments — around eight percent of total government spending — a sum that exceeded total corporation tax receipts. With 10-year government borrowing rates around five percent in 2026, and GDP growth modest, the UK too is operating in territory where the old arithmetic no longer offers a free ride.
Why It Matters
It is easy to treat government debt as an abstract number on a distant ledger. The r-g framework makes the stakes concrete. When r exceeds g, every unit of money borrowed today costs more in real terms to service tomorrow — and that cost lands somewhere specific. It crowds out spending on hospitals, roads, and education as interest becomes an ever-larger claim on tax revenue. It can push up borrowing costs across the entire economy, raising the rates that households pay on mortgages and businesses pay on loans, as higher government bond yields ripple outward. And it narrows the space governments have to respond to the next crisis — a recession, a pandemic, a war — because the fiscal buffers that made large emergency borrowing safe in a low-rate world are thinner. None of this means catastrophe is inevitable. Blanchard himself is careful to argue that debt sustainability is probabilistic, not a cliff edge — there is no magic threshold at which everything breaks. But it does mean the era in which governments could borrow expansively at little long-run cost is probably over for now. What comes next — whether growth accelerates, rates fall, or primary surpluses are found — is the defining fiscal question of the decade.
A Question to Ponder
If governments can no longer rely on economic growth quietly eroding their debt, which spending commitments are genuinely worth making now — and which were only ever affordable because of a mathematical condition that may not return?
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